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CENSORING INDECENT CABLE PROGRAMS:
THE NEW MORALITY MEETS THE NEW MEDIA
THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER * and
MARJORIE L. ESTEROW**
INTRODUCTION
C ABLE television, originally utilized to retransmit programs to
communities unable to receive over-the-air broadcasting from the
three commercial networks, is increasingly becoming an important
source of information and entertainment for Americans.' The form
and content of cable programming, however, has recently engendered
controversy. The issue is morality; the subject of attack is indecent
programming.
Moral activists are seeking to ban "indecent" programming from
cable systems. The precise boundaries of what constitutes indecent
material are at best unclear. Somewhere between hardcore pornogra-
phy and the innocuous kiss is probably a good guess. Within those
boundaries, however, lies a good deal of nudity, "dirty" words, soft-
core sex, and sexual innuendos. The purpose of this Article is to
analyze the competing interests at stake and evaluate whether, under
current law, indecent material may constitutionally be proscribed on
cable television.2
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 1965, Swarthmore
College; J.D. 1968, Columbia University.
** Class of 1983, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 1980, University of
Pennsylvania.
Professor L.A. Powe, Jr., University of Texas School of Law, is the godfather of
this Article. See Powe, Cable and Obscenity, 24 Cath. U.L. Rev. 719 (1975). As is
traditional in such cases, he is to be credited for what is good, but held blameless for
what is bad, in the offspring. Professor Richard Alan Gordon, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center, also provided helpful support to the authors as they worked through
these issues.
1. Approximately 29% (23.7 million) of all the homes in this country with
television sets receive cable. Broadcasting, May 3, 1982, at 37. For estimates of cable
penetration as of May, 1982 by Nielsen and Arbitron, respectively, see id., June 28,
1982, at 32-34.
2. The issue whether the first amendment tolerates punishment for nonobscene,
indecent cable television transmissions might arise in a legal proceeding in either of
two ways. First, a cable company might challenge a cable indecency statute "as
applied," that is, asserting that the nonobscene material it transmits is constitution-
ally protected. In the course of its argument, the cable company undoubtedly would
assert that it necessarily must prevail because no indecent, but not obscene, cable
programs may be censored constitutionally. It is that assertion that will be analyzed
in this Article.
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The answer to that question is likely to produce many different
effects, important to quite diverse groups. For example, the nature of
cable television's audience appeal may be affected. By its nature, one
cable system can simultaneously transmit dozens of non-interfering
local signals. Therefore, the cable operator need not gear programs to
appeal to the mass populace, and, more importantly, has an economic
incentive to provide subscribers with many alternatives. The "inde-
cency" issue raises the question whether cable enjoys constitutional
assurance that it can provide the wide diversity offered by other
media, such as films, magazines, records, books and nightclubs.
Effects will also be felt in the film industry, which increasingly
views cable as an additional revenue source. If indecency can be
banned on cable, theatrical film producers seeking to maximize reve-^
nue by increasing the number of outlets for their product may find it
in their best economic interest to "clean up" their scripts.
Those who view cable television as possessing a unique potential to
harm (or help) American youth are yet another group deeply affected
by the constitutionality of statutes proscribing indecency on cable.
Newly popular media presenting "adult" fare have consistently pro-
voked debate among Americans as to their effects on young people, 3
and this pattern suggests that substantial dispute will soon arise over
cable's effects on American youth. No legislative response is more
directly targeted at fears that cable corrupts than a ban on indecent
cablecasts.
The issue might also arise in an "overbreadth" attack in which the cable firm asks
that the statute be declared facially unconstitutional because it regulates indecent,
but nonobseene, programs. Although the first amendment principle at issue (whether
nonobscene, indecent cable programs can be banned) is identical to that initially
raised by an "as applied" attack, the facial challenge is more dubious because it asks
that the entire statute be stricken. Since obscenity is likely to be indecent within the
meaning of the statute, the overbreadth remedy may be improper.
Even if the state may not punish nonobscene, indecent cable programs, conceiv-
ably it may utilize an indecency statute to punish obscenity. The Supreme Court has
asserted that, to withstand constitutional scrutiny, obscenity statutes must be nar-
rowly and specifically written. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973). But
the Court has also refused to find substantially overbroad a state statute regulating
sexually provocative pictures of minors on the ground that most such depictions can
be regulated without adverting to the possibility that many of these depictions might
be covered by obscenity statutes. New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3359-63
(1982). Ferber suggests that a state might, notvithstanding Miller, successfully avoid
an "overbreadth" or "facial" attack on a statute banning indecent cable programs by
demonstrating that many statutorily indecent programs are in fact constitutionally
unprotected obscenity. The authors would not advocate this result. The proper scope
of the overbreadth principle, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
3. See Krattenmaker and Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Princi-
ples and Social Science Theory, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1123, 1288-92 (1978).
608 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, statutes banning
indecency on cable raise significant first amendment doctrinal issues.
Determining how far the state may go in regulating cable television
content requires, in particular, a careful examination of the Supreme
Court's most permissive first amendment ruling in the past three
decades-FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.4 For many reasons, detailed
below, proponents of cable program regulation are likely to seek
expansion of the bounds of Pacifica's standard of permissible govern-
ment regulation. This Article concludes, however, that no acceptable
interpretation of Pacifica would permit government to exclude from
cable even the most indecent nonobscene programming.
I. INDECENCY STATUTES AND INITIAL JUDICIAL REACTION
In its 1981 session, the Utah legislature enacted a statute prohibiting
any person from "knowingly distribut[ing] by wire or cable any por-
nographic or indecent material to its subscribers."' 5 Violation of the
statute would constitute a class A misdemeanor. 6 The terms "porno-
graphic" and "indecent" were defined by other Utah statutes. 7 Before
4. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 74-109.
5. The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1229 (Supp. 1981) provides:
(1) No person, including a franchisee, shall knowingly distribute by
wire or cable any pornographic or indecent material to its sub-
scribers.
(2) For purposes of this section "material" means any visual display
shown on a cable television system, whether or not accompanied by
sound, or any sound recording played on a cable television system.
(3) For purposes of this section "pornographic material" is any mate-
rial defined as pornographic in sections 76-10-1201 and 76-10-1203.
(4) For purposes of this section "indecent material" means any material
described in section 76-10-1227.
(5) For purposes of this section "distribute" means to send, transmit,
retransmit, or otherwise pass through a cable television system.
(6) Prosecution for violation of this section may be initiated at the
instance of the attorney general or any county or city attorney of an
interested political subdivision or at the instance of the governing
body of any such political subdivision.
(7) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor.
6. A class A misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing one year and a fine not exceeding $1000 for a person, $5000 for a corporation. Id.
§§ 76-3-204, -301 to -302 (1978).
7. "Pornography" is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1203 (1978) as follows:
(1) Any material or performance is pornographic if:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community stand-
ards, finds that, taken as a whole, it appeals to the prurient
interest in sex;
(b) It is patently offensive in the description or depiction of nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, or
excretion; and
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the statute went into effect, national and local cable distributors and
franchisees brought a class action in the Utah federal district court
seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute so sweepingly denied
first amendment rights that it was unconstitutionally overbroad.8 The
plaintiffs further sought injunctive relief prohibiting the statute's en-
forcement."
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson,10 the district court struck
down the statute as unconstitutionally overbroad." Its opinion relied
principally on the Supreme Court's leading obscenity decision, Miller
v. California,12 which established a three-part test for permissible
state regulation of obscene material. Under Miller, material is not
obscene unless: 1) it appeals to the prurient interest; 2) it depicts or
describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and 3) as a whole
it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.13
Although the Miller test requires that the existence of obscenity be
determined with respect to the work "taken as a whole,"14 the Utah
statute proscribed "nude or partially denuded figures" and "descrip-
tions or depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality" without consid-
eration of the context in which the material was presented.' 5 The
Wilkinson court observed that, under Miller, the mere portrayal of
(c) Taken as a whole it does not have serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific value.
"Indecent material" is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1227 (Supp. 1981) as
follows:
(1) "Description or depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality"
means:
(a) Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
(b) Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or sodomy; or
(c) Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic re-
gion, buttock, or female breast.
(2) "Nude or partially denuded figures" means:
(a) Less than completely and opaquely covered:
(i) Human genitals;
(ii) Pubic regions;
(iii) Buttock; and
(iv) Female breast below a point immediately above the top of the
areola; and
(b) Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if com-
pletely and opaquely covered.
8. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D. Utah 1982).
The plaintiff's challenge was to the indecency, and not the pornography, section of
the statute. Id. at 995 & n. 15.
9. Id. at 990.
10. 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982).
11. Id. at 999.
12. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See infra text accompanying notes 43-49.
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id.
15. See supra notes 5, 7.
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nudity and sex, without more, cannot be denied first amendment
protection-simply labeling an expression obscene or indecent does
not make it so. 16 Further, the state's asserted interest in protecting
hypothetical minors did not save the statute, which was overbroad as
to minors as well as to adults. 17 To be constitutional, the court con-
cluded, a state content-based programming regulation must, unlike
the Utah statute, incorporate the three-part test set out in Miller.'8
The Utah statute was hardly an isolated instance of an attempt to
promulgate an indecency statute for cable television. Other legisla-
tion, more carefully drafted, is likely to require a more searching
review of Miller and other precedents. For example, Morality in
Media, a New York-based organization, is circulating a model cable
indecency statute that would make criminal the distribution of inde-
cent material on cable television.19 As defined, "[i]ndecent material"
16. 531 F. Supp. at 996.
17. Id. at 997.
18. Id. at 998. In holding the statute unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds,
the district court did not reach the issue of the specific first amendment right of cable
operators to show "indecent" programming. The court did state, however,
that Miller established the permissible boundary of state regulation, and that by
seeking to ban less than hard-core pornography, the statute went beyond Miller. Id.
at 995-96. Further, to extend Miller to facilitate society's making correct and moral
choices "runs counter to the settled constitutional rule that the States have no power
to control the moral content of a person's thoughts." Id. at 1001. Moreover, the court
noted that the unique advantages of cable derive from the diversity of its program-
ming and the increased ability of subscribers to choose. Id. at 1001-02. Thus, Wilkin-
son apparently concludes that any attempt to proscribe indecent material, other than
obscenity, on cable television would be unconstitutional.
Wilkinson, however, hardly resolves the question raised in this Article. Eight of the
nine Justices that decided Miller also participated in the Pacifica case, which specifi-
cally authorizes the Federal Communications Commission to proscribe nonobscene,
indecent radio programming. Thus, to assert only that regulation of indecent cable
programs transgresses the bounds of Miller is insufficient.
19. The Morality in Media model indecency statute provides:
Section 1
(a) No person (including franchisee) shall by means of a cable television
system, knowingly distribute by wire or cable to its subscribers any
indecent material or knowingly provide such material for distribu-
tion.
(b) "Person" shall include individuals, partnerships, associations and cor-
porations.
(c) "Distribute" shall mean send, transmit or retransmit or otherwise pass
through a cable television system.
(d) "Material" means any visual material shown on a cable television
system, whether or not accompanied by a soundtrack, or any sound
recording played on a cable television system.
(e) "Indecent material" shall mean material which is a representation or
verbal description of:
1. a human sexual or excretory organ or function; or
2. nudity; or
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includes representations or verbal descriptions of "1. a human sexual
or excretory organ or function; or 2. nudity; or 3. ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or 4. masturbation.12 0 This
statute differs most significantly from the Utah law by taking context
into account, that is, limiting offenses to those representations that are
"patently offensive" under "contemporary community standards for
cable television."'"1
Analogous statutes are being introduced throughout the nation.
Senator Dennis DeConcini (D. Ariz.) has introduced a bill that would
amend the Communications Act of 193422 to authorize fines and/or
imprisonment for those who utter or distribute obscene, indecent or
profane language or material on any television transmission, including
cable.2 3 The Massachusetts House of Representatives has given initial
approval to legislation that would prohibit the showing of X-rated
movies on cable television. 24 Last year, Florida state legislators intro-
duced a proposal that would prohibit cable television stations from
3. ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or
4. masturbation;
which under contemporary community standards for cable television is
patently offensive.
(f) "Community Standards" shall mean the standards of the community
encompassed within the territorial area covered by the franchise.
(g) "Provide" means to supply for use.
(h) "A person acts knowingly" if he has knowledge of the character or
nature of the material involved. A person is presumed to have knowl-
edge of the character or nature of the material if he has actual notice
of the nature of such material whether or not he has precise notice of
its contents.
Section 2
Violation of this statute shall constitute a misdemeanor and any person con-
victed of such violation shall be. confined in jail for not more than
months or fined not more than
Dollars, either or both.
A copy of this model statute can be obtained from Morality in Media, 475 Riverdale
Drive, New York, New York.
Indeed, an ordinance somewhat similar to this model was adopted by the City of
Roy, Utah after the Wilkinson decision. That statute, too, has been declared uncon-
stitutional by the same judge who decided Wilkinson. Community Television of
Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, Nos. 82-0122J, 82-0171J (D. Utah Jan. 6, 1983) (available
Mar. 14, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
20. See supra note 19.
21. Id.
22. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
23. S. 2136, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). For a brief discussion of this bill, see
Broadcasting, Mar. 8, 1982, at 142.
24. Mass. H. 3023 (1982). Although the proposed legislation would prohibit the
showing of all X-rated movies on cable, J. Michael Ruane, the bill's sponsor, has
stated that he is principally concerned with the exhibition of X-rated films during the
daytime hours. Letter from J. Michael Ruane to the author (Apr. 14, 1982) (discus-
sing the proposed legislation). A copy of this letter is on file with the Fordham Law
Review.
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showing "R-" or "X-" rated movies, except after 10 p.m.2 5 Whether
these bills will be enacted is, of course, unpredictable. But collectively
they are increasing the extent of debate over the appropriate standards
for regulating cable content.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
Thus, cable television programming is rapidly becoming an issue of
national prominence. But what are cable stations showing? Home Box
Office (HBO), the nation's oldest and largest national pay television
service, provides programming to some seven million subscribers.26
Feature films, originally shown in movie theatres, comprise approxi-
mately 78% of the overall HBO schedule. 27 These films are shown
exactly as they were in the theatres; HBO is prohibited by contracts
with its major program suppliers from editing the films. 2 Movies
shown on HBO have included "Kramer vs. Kramer," "Coming
Home," "The Deerhunter," and "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest."
Each of these films received an "R" rating and contains one or more
scenes of nudity.2 9 Each of the above-mentioned films has also won or
was nominated for an Academy Award. HBO also shows a number of
"PG-" rated films that contain scenes of nudity. 3° In addition to
feature films, HBO exhibits special entertainment programming,
which, on occasion, may contain isolated scenes of nudity. 31
Playboy's "Escapade" channel, which has about 200,000 paid sub-
scribers, describes itself as exhibiting a "hard R" type of program-
ming. 32 The network deliberately limits its programming, excluding
explicit sex, erections and penetration, to prevent the station from
getting an "X-rated" image. 33 The Escapade channel will, however,
air implicit sex, nudity and explicit language. The channel's premier
package included an interview with John and Bo Derek, video center-
fold segments, a Playmate-comedian wrestling match, and a "Ribald
Classics" feature in which two lovers are shown caressing in an "R-
rated" fashion. 34
25. See Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 28, col. 1. The bill died in committee, but is
being reintroduced this year in the State Senate. Id.
26. See Broadcasting, Nov. 30, 1981, at 36.
27. See Brief for Plaintiff at 6, Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp.
987 (D. Utah 1982).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 6-7.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 7-8.
32. See Broadcasting, Feb. 22, 1982, at 56-57. Bob Shanks, who is responsible for
development and program production, stated that, "[tihe real raincoat crowd ...
won't be signing up in droves for the Playboy channel." Id. at 56.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Some cable public access channels also present indecent program-
ming. In New York, for example, George Urban is a public access
producer on Manhattan Cable. Urban's weekly show, "The Ugly
George Hour of Truth, Sex, and Violence," consists of Urban's conver-
sations with women he attempts to convince, often successfully, to
disrobe in front of his camera.3 5
Programming on cable that potentially violates statutes proscribing
indecency thus runs the gamut from award-winning feature films to
moderately graphic sex short of pornography. To some extent, the
more specific provisions of various indecency statutes will dictate
different results for some films. Whether a film such as "Kramer vs.
Kramer" would be proscribed as indecent programming under the
Morality in Media statute, for example, is unclear because of the
limiting clause .3 The sex and nudity in that movie might or might not
be considered patently offensive under contemporary community
standards. The film would be clearly prohibited under the proposed
Florida law. 37 At the other extreme, Urban's program surely flunks
the Morality in Media statute and could violate the DeConcini bill.38
All of the above-mentioned programming likely would be banned
under the Utah statute for exhibiting "nude or partially denuded
figures," as that statute lacks a "patently offensive by community
standards" clause.39
As the Wilkinson case makes clear, however, uncertainty surrounds
the question whether any regulation of indecency on cable is constitu-
tional. 40 Certainly, the Wilkinson court's rationale fully explains why
a statute banning indecent, but not obscene, books would be unconsti-
tutional. But the Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation41 has
held that the first amendment does not prohibit the proscription of
indecent radio broadcasts. 42 Assuming the continued validity of both
Miller and Pacifica, then, analysis of the present question must begin
by examining the precise bases of those and related cases.
III. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND: OFFENSIVE SPEECH
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. A Pre-Pacifica Trilogy: Miller, Cohen, Erznoznik
Miller v. California,43 the Supreme Court's controlling obscenity
opinion, provides a principal backdrop. Miller upheld the application
35. Waters & Gelman, Cable's Blues in the Night, Newsweek, Aug. 24, 1981, at
48.
36. See supra text accompanying note 21.
37. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
40. See supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.
41. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
42. Id. at 744-50. See infra text accompanying notes 74-109.
43. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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of California's criminal obscenity statute44 to a mass mailing advertis-
ing the sale of "adult" material. The Court concluded that the states
have a legitimate interest in prohibiting the dissemination and exhibi-
tion of obscenity, and need not demonstrate that such regulation
meets traditional first amendment tests because obscenity is not consti-
tutionally protected "speech."' 45 State statutes that seek to regulate
such material, however, must be carefully limited to proscribe only
materials that depict or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual
activities. 46 To this end, the Court set out three factual tests, each of
which must be met before expression may be deemed obscene and
therefore regulable. States may classify as obscene material that "(a)
. .. 'the average person, applying contemporary community stand-
ards' would find. . ., taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient inter-
est ... ; (b) ...depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) ...taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." 47
Clearly, Miller permits the state to regulate a narrowly defined
class of offensive, sexually-related materials that appeal to the pruri-
ent interest and as a whole lack redeeming qualities .4 But that is as
far as the opinion goes-only obscenity is regulable .4  Two other
Supreme Court opinions, one pre-Miller and the other post-Miller,
confine the boundaries of permissible state regulation of offensive,
nonobscene communication.
In Cohen v. Calijornia,50 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
under a California statute that prohibited individuals from "mali-
ciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighbor-
44. Act of July 19, 1961, ch. 2147, § 5, 1961 Cal. Stat. 4427 (codified as amended
at Cal. Penal Code § 311 (West Supp. 1982)).
45. 413 U.S. at 23. The Court had earlier determined that the first amendment
does not extend to the protection of obscene material. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 485 (1957).
46. 413 U.S. at 27.
47. Id. at 24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (citations
omitted)).
48. To clarify the type of speech the state could constitutionally regulate, the
Court set out two examples: "(a) [p]atently offensive representations or descriptions
of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated," and "(b) [p]at-
ently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. at 25.
49. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (reversing conviction for
distributing the theatrical film, "Carnal Knowledge"). The Court held the film was
protected notwithstanding scenes of nudity, apparently in large measure because the
movie did not portray actors' bodies (or genitals) during sexual intercourse. Id. at
161.
50. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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hood or person . . .by ... offensive conduct." 51 Cohen's offensive
conduct consisted of wearing a jacket inscribed with the words "Fuck
the Draft" to portray his feelings about the Vietnam War. The Court
spoke directly to three issues prominent in the cable-indecency debate.
First, the Court noted that, although potentially offensive, Cohen's
words did not constitute obscenity.52 Although his language contained
at least literal sexual overtones, Cohen's expression was not obscene
because it was not "erotic," nor would it conjure up similar "psychic
stimulation. 53
Second, the state argued that Cohen's conviction was a permissible
exercise of its power to protect unwilling viewers from exposure to
objectionable speech.5 4 The Court disagreed. In order to ban the
public expression of ideas, the state must show "that substantial pri-
vacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilec-
tions." 55 The majority listed several reasons why the interest in pro-
tecting unwilling viewers was insufficient in this instance. 6 Promi-
nent among those reasons was that the recipients of Cohen's message
were "outside the sanctuary of [their] home[s]"57 and therefore could
avoid further verbal or visual assault "simply by averting their
eyes."58
Finally, the Court squarely rejected the proposition that nonob-
scene, offensive language could be proscribed consistently with the
first amendment. In addition to asserting that the state may not
constitutionally "cleanse public debate to the point where it is gram-
matically palatable to the most squeamish among us," 59 the Court
noted the inherent danger to the interchange of ideas in a free society
that would flow from excising certain words from the public's vocabu-
lary.10 One's choice of words may not only convey the specific mean-
ing attached to them, but other meanings (including nuances of style,
tone, and emotion) as well. 6 1 Cohen clearly represents such a case, in
51. Cal. Penal Code § 415 (West 1970), repealed by Act of Sept. 23, 1974, ch.
1263, 1974 Cal. Stat. 2742.
52. 403 U.S. at 20.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 21-22.
57. Id. at 21 (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728,
738 (1970)).
58. 403 U.S. at 21.
59. Id. at 25. The Court emphasized this point by the often-quoted statement,
"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Id.
60. Id. at 24-26.
61. Id. at 26.
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which the speaker chose his words especially for the force of the
reaction they would engender. To compel Cohen to choose a different
expression would likely convey a different idea; in a very real sense,
Cohen did not say, or wish to be understood as saying, "I sincerely
and vigorously urge abolition of the Selective Service System."
Cohen represents one boundary of impermissible state regulation of
offensive speech. The Court addressed a similar issue, albeit concern-
ing a different medium, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.62
Erznoznik involved a challenge to the facial validity of a Jacksonville,
Florida municipal ordinance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters
from exhibiting films containing nudity when the screen is visible
from public places. 63 The Court held the ordinance invalid under the
first amendment.6 4
The Court noted that the government's power to censor certain
types of speech must be carefully limited. 5 Although the public is
often "captive" to offensive speech, absent a showing of a substantial,
intolerable invasion of privacy interests, the unwilling viewer is
obliged simply to avert his eyes. 66 Thus, the Court dismissed the state's
primary argument that it may protect its citizens from exposure to
offensive materials.67
The state also argued that the ordinance was valid as an exercise of
its police power to protect children from offensive material.6, The
Court disagreed and held the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.6 9
The ordinance prohibited all nudity, without considering the work as
a whole. Therefore, the statute literally barred innocuous or even
educational films, such as "a film containing a picture of a baby's
buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in
which nudity is indigenous." '70 Moreover, children as well as adults
62. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
63. Jacksonville, Fla., Mun. Code § 330.313 (1972). The text of the ordinance is
reprinted in the Erznoznik opinion. 422 U.S. at 206-07.
64. 422 U.S. at 217-18.
65. Id. at 209.
66. Id. at 210-11; see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). The Court
cited Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) as an example of
an intolerable intrusion on privacy interests. In Rowan, the Court upheld a federal
statute that permitted unwilling recipients of offensive mail (i.e., "erotically arousing
or sexually provocative," id. at 730) to obtain a post office order requiring the sender
to stop all such mailings to the addressee. The Court held that the mailer's right to
communicate was subordinate to the individual's right to privacy in the home. Id. at
736-38. It is important to note that the statute upheld in Rowan did not prohibit the
sender from communicating with receptive addressees, but rather allowed unwilling
recipients to exercise control over unwanted mail reaching their homes.
67. 422 U.S. at 212.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 214.
70. Id. at 213.
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have first amendment rights, 7' and the obscenity doctrine defines the
limits of state authority to protect children from offensive speech. For
that purpose, the state may only regulate materials that, taken as a
whole, are obscene for young people. 72
Thus, the confines of permissible regulation of speech considered
indecent or offensive were fairly well-defined and understood until
1978. The states could proscribe offensive material that rose to the
level of obscenity, that is, hard-core pornography. Children could be
shielded from material obscene only as to them, but not in a manner
that denied adults their rights. 73 Cohen and Erznoznik represent
failed attempts by state and local governments to ban less than ob-
scene material merely because it may offend an unwilling viewer,
who could easily avoid sustained injury. Surely, the easiest inference
from Miller, Cohen and Erznoznik is that no statute prohibiting mere
indecent cable programming could withstand a first amendment chal-
lenge.
B. Pacifica
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court clouded the meaning of that
trilogy by approving a content ban on an indecent radio broadcast in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.74 The argument for the constitutionality
of statutes banning indecency on cable television must rest principally
upon the view that Pacifica extends state censorship authority for
certain media beyond the limits that Miller, Cohen and Erznoznik
apparently established.
The issue before the Court in Pacifica was whether the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) had the power
to regulate an indecent, but not obscene, radio broadcast. 75 The Court
concluded that it did. At 2 p.m. in New York City, a radio station
owned by Pacifica broadcast a George Carlin recording entitled
"Filthy Words," a satirical monologue of Carlin's thoughts concerning
words that could never be said on the public airwaves. 76 Carlin pro-
71. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
72. See 422 U.S. at 212-14; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-43 (1968)
(statute defining obscenity in terms of its appeal to the prurient interests of minors
held constitutional).
73. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). In Butler, the Court struck
down a statute that barred distribution to the general public of material that was
obscene only to children, and held that the state could not reduce the adult popula-
tion "to reading only what is fit for children." Id. at 383.
74. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
75. Id. at 729.
76. Id. at 729-30.
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ceeded to list those words and repeat them over and over. 77 A man,
while driving with his young son, heard the broadcast and com-
plained to the Commission. 78 In response to the complaint, the station
claimed that the recording was part of a program about society's
attitudes toward language and that prior to the broadcast listeners
were advised that the recording contained language some might con-
sider offensive. 79 The Commission nevertheless issued a declaratory
order holding that Pacifica could be subject to administrative sanc-
tions for the Carlin broadcast.8 0
The Commission was especially concerned with the exposure of
children to offensive material. Recognizing that the material in the
Carlin monologue was not obscene, and therefore not without first
amendment protection, the Commission drew on the law of nuisance
to support its decision.8' Nuisance law attempts to channel, rather
than prohibit, offensive behavior.8 2 Thus, the FCC determined such
programs could and should be channelled. The monologue was inde-
cent because it was broadcast at a time when children were likely to
be in the audience.8 3 The Commission stated that similar programs,
broadcast in the late evening and preceded by warnings, might be
permissible.8 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the FCC's order. 5 judge Tamm, writing for the court, held
that the order violated the Commission's duty to avoid censorship,
and further, was overbroad and vague.86 Judge Bazelon, concurring
in the result, determined that under Miller the FCC lacked the power
77. The seven dirty words spoken by Carlin to which the FCC objected were
"fuck," "shit," "piss," "motherfucker," "cocksucker," "cunt" and "tit." Pacifica
Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438
U.S. 726 (1978). A verbatim transcript of the Pacifica broadcast appears in the
appendix to the Court's decision. 438 U.S. at 751-55 app.
78. 438 U.S. at 730.
79. Id.
80. See Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Although the Commission issued no formal sanc-
tions, the complaint became part of the station's license file, to be considered if
subsequent complaints made sanctions in order. Id. The sanctions the Commission
has the authority to impose are: 1) revoke a station's license; 2) issue a cease and desist
order; 3) impose a monetary forfeiture; 4) deny license renewal; and 5) grant a short
term renewal. 438 U.S. at 730 & n.1.
81. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 98-99. The Commission stated that if the offensive program were aired
at a time of day when the number of children in the audience was reduced to a
minimum, it would consider whether the broadcast material had redeeming quali-
ties. Id.
85. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
86. Id.
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to regulate indecent, but not obscene, speech.8 7 Judge Leventhal dis-
sented, stating that the focus of review should be limited to whether
the language, "as broadcast,"'8 8 was indecent, and determined that it
was.
8 9
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and affirmed the
FCC. Taking its cue from Judge Leventhal's dissent, the Pacifica
majority asked only whether the monologue was indecent "as broad-
cast."90 Because the Commission had not engaged in formal rulemak-
ing and had restricted its order to the specific factual context, the
Court refrained from issuing an advisory opinion for future cases.9'
The Court determined that the Carlin monologue was indecent
within the meaning of Section 1464 of the federal Criminal Code.9 2 In
relevant part, this statute makes it a crime to utter "any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication."' 9 3
Pacifica argued that, in order to be indecent within the meaning of
the statute, the material presented must appeal to the prurient inter-
est, which the Carlin monologue clearly did not.9 4 The Court dis-
agreed, holding that the three types of proscribed language in the
statute each have a separate meaning. 5 Although prurient appeal is
an element of the obscene, to be indecent, material need only fail to
conform to the general accepted standards of morality. 96 Therefore,
since the Carlin monologue was patently offensive under that defini-
tion,9 7 it was indecent within the meaning of the statute. 8
After clearing the statutory hurdles, the Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of the Commission's action. Initially, the Court noted that
87. Id. at 21-30 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 31-32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 31 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
90. 438 U.S. at 734-35.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 738-41. Initially the Court determined that the Commission's action
did not constitute forbidden censorship within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1976). 438 U.S. at 735-38. Although the Commission lacks the power to edit the
content of broadcasting in advance, it may review completed broadcasts as part of its
regulatory duties. Moreover, because the Commission has authority under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 to regulate obscene, indecent or profane broadcasting, § 326 must be read as
inapplicable to such material. Id.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). Section 1464 was originally enacted as § 29 of the
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, § 29, 44 Stat. 1162, 1172, and later re-enacted in
the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 326, 48 Stat. 1064, 1091. In
1948, the section was removed from the Communications Act and codified in the
Criminal Code as § 1464 of Title 18. See 438 U.S. at 735-38.
94. 438 U.S. at 739.
95. Id. at 739-40.
96. Id. at 740 & n.14.
97. Id. at 739.
98. Id. at 741.
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broadcasting receives the most limited first amendment protection of
all forms of communication, asserting that this distinct treatment is
warranted because broadcasting is uniquely pervasive and uniquely
accessible to children. 99 Thus, the crux of the Court's justification for
holding the monologue indecent "as broadcast" rested on an "intru-
siveness" rationale.
The Pacifica majority asserted that material presented over the
airwaves confronts the individual in all aspects of daily life. 100 Radio's
pervasiveness is particularly relevant because its effects occur in the
home, where the individual's privacy interests outweigh the first
amendment rights of the intruder. 101 Moreover, prior warnings about
the possible offensiveness of a program's content are ineffective be-
cause the listening audience constantly turns the radio on and off.102
To say simply that the radio may be turned off if one is offended by
the language presented "is like saying that the remedy for an assault is
to run away after the first blow." 103
Further, the Court explained, in addition to its legitimate authority
to protect adults' sensibilities in the home, the state has an interest in
protecting children from offensive material. 104 On this score as well,
radio's intrusiveness underlay the Court's analysis. Although Carlin's
monologue is protected by the first amendment, and therefore cannot
be restricted at its source, it may be withheld from the broadcast
media. 0 5 Because radios in the home are uniquely accessible to chil-
dren, and because of the state and parental interest in minors' well-
being, special treatment for indecent material broadcast in the home
is constitutionally justified. 106
Finally, the Court emphasized the narrowness of its decision, re-
peating the assertion that only the FCC's authority to punish that
specific broadcast was at issue. 107 Referring to the Commission's anal-
ogy to nuisance law, which asserted that the question was not whether
to prohibit, but only whether to channel, indecent material, the
Court noted that the context of the broadcast is most important in
resolving that question. 08 Factors to be taken into consideration in
99. Id. at 748-50.
100. Id. at 748.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 748-49. The Court noted in a footnote, however, that the situation
outside the home may be different. Id. at 749 n.27 (citing Cohen and Erznoznik).
There, the remedy of averting ears or eyes may be sufficient; that is, the balance may
tip in favor of the speaker.
104. Id. at 749-50.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 750.
108. Id.
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determining whether material is indecent "as broadcast" include the
time of day, composition of the audience, content of the program, and
differences among radio, television and possibly closed-circuit trans-
missions. 109
IV. INDECENT PROGRAMS AND FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
Prior to Pacifica, the Supreme Court relied on an ill-considered
scarcity rationale to justify distinct first amendment treatment of the
broadcast media." 0 Because broadcast frequencies constitute a scarce
resource, ' the government, according to this rationale, should be
"permitted to put restraints on [broadcast] licensees in favor of others
whose views should be expressed on this unique medium." 112 But no
scarcity rationale, well- or ill-considered, can logically justify reduc-
ing the amount of offbeat or unusual broadcast programming." 3
Spectrum scarcity justifies, if anything, diversity of speech in the
broadcast medium, not government censorship. Therefore, the scar-
city rationale unsurprisingly provided no support for the Pacifica
result.
In employing an intrusiveness theory, the Court introduced new
criteria for evaluating content regulation-"medium pervasiveness"
and "minors' access." Although the Court took pains to assert the
narrowness of its holding and to emphasize the peculiar scurrility of
Carlin's monologue, the precise rationales employed to justify that
holding contain no easily ascertainable limits. Many broadcasts may
not conform to "generally accepted standards of morality," the defini-
tion of indecency adopted by the Pacifica majority. "14 Nor is radio the
only medium that may enter the home when unsupervised children
are present." ' 5 Consequently, the substantial tension between Pacifi-
ca's holding and its rationale leaves the outer limits of the case ob-
scure. One thing is certain. In allowing regulation of indecent, but
nonobscene material, Pacifica goes further than Miller. How much
109. Id.
110. The scarcity rationale was first set forth in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969). For criticisms of this theory, see B. Owen,
Economics and Freedom of Expression 34-37 (1976); Powe, "Or of the [Broadcast]
Press," 55 Tex. L. Rev. 39, 55-62 (1976); Van Alstyne, The Mbbius Strip of the First
Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. Rev. 539, 548-60 (1978).
111. 395 U.S. at 376, 399.
112. Id. at 390.
113. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
114. Id. at 740 n.14 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(1966)).
115. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 3, at 1232-33 (records, books, newspa-
pers, magazines and letters).
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further, and to what other media, if any, the intrusiveness rationale
may be applicable, is still open to question.
The analysis that follows seeks to determine whether a fair interpre-
tation of Pacifica would justify regulation of indecent programming
on cable television. Concededly powerful arguments can be advanced
that Pacifica does indeed authorize such regulation, and would permit
even wider restraints. Moreover, it can be argued that Pacifica also
authorizes the regulatory approaches embodied in the Morality in
Media and Utah statutes, which are likely to be prototypical formula-
tions for legislators seeking to do more than enact a law simply barring
indecent programs. These arguments are elaborated below. The re-
mainder of the Article nevertheless concludes that no acceptable inter-
pretation of Pacifica would permit government to exclude from cable
even the most indecent nonobscene fare.
A. The Argument for Permitting Regulation
Pacifica altered the outer limits of permissible regulation of offen-
sive material, extending the boundaries previously set by Miller. Ma-
terial need not be obscene under the Miller guidelines to be pro-
scribed, but only patently offensive by contemporary moral standards
or not in conformance with generally accepted standards of morality.
Thus, Pacifica has carved out a new class of speech, "indecency,"
subject to content regulation.
To be sure, Pacifica cannot plausibly be read to authorize proscrip-
tion of indecent expression in all media. Miller, Cohen and Erznoznik
were distinguished, not overruled, in Pacifica. Rather, for Pacifica to
govern, the speech must be unduly intrusive as well. But Pacifica's
conclusion that radio is especially intrusive rests on reasons equally
applicable to cable television. Four distinct arguments suggest that
Pacifica affects the rights of all broadcasters (including cable systems)
to present offensive material, and not simply those that transmit
exclusively aural signals.
First, the pervasiveness of a communications medium is unaffected
by whether its programming is transmitted over the airwaves or over
cable lines. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested as much in an
otherwise unrelated case, by determining that the FCC may regulate
cable systems as broadcasters, but not as common carriers.116 More-
over, cable is rapidly becoming a part of many American households.
By its nature, in those homes in which cable is present, it is used
interchangeably with radio and television. The medium used to trans-
mit the programming, from the viewer's perspective, is his television
set. This being the case, viewers should receive the same protections
116. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699-704 (1979).
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from cablecasts of indecent programming as they do from television
and radio broadcasts.
Second, cable programming, like radio and television, is presented
in the home, and is thus subject to more limited first amendment
protection than other communication taking place outside the home.
When the viewer turns on his cable television system, he is equally
captive to what the cable system presents as he is to radio broadcasts
when he tunes in to them. Prior warnings about the content of a
program are ineffective because the viewer often tunes in during the
middle of a show. An unwilling viewer would therefore be unable to
avoid assault by an indecent broadcast, and in one's home "the indi-
vidual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder."1 7
Pacifica teaches that cases such as Cohen and Erznoznik are inap-
plicable to cable programming. Cohen and Erznoznik involved inde-
cent speech communicated outside the home. When out in public, the
offended individual may have the duty to avert his eyes or ears; that
is, the constitutional balance may tip in favor of the speaker." '8 In the
home, however, a "captive" audience need not be subject to offensive
speech. Because the competing first amendment interests tip in favor
of the individual's right to privacy in the home, to tell the viewer to
shut off his television set when affronted by indecent programming
ignores the issue. As stated by the Pacifica Court, it is akin to "saying
that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow." "1
Third, an important element of the pervasiveness theory is that the
broadcast media is uniquely accessible to children. Cable television is
as easily accessible to unsupervised children in the home as is radio.
This characteristic is particularly relevant to children too young to
comprehend the written word, but who are quite capable of "learn-
ing" from indecent broadcasts. Two distinct state interests justify state
regulation of indecent broadcasts when minors are likely to be in the
audience. The first is the "parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children." 2 0 Second, the state
possesses an independent interest in the well-being of children.'12
These interests in promoting the welfare of children and facilitating
the development of their moral values justify the regulation of other-
wise protected speech. Because cable is no less accessible and is poten-
tially more harmful to children than radio, the permissible state inter-
117. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); see Rowan v. United
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970).
118. See 438 U.S. at 749 n.27.
119. Id. at 749.
120. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
121. Id. at 640.
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ests described in Pacifica therefore justify regulation of cable as well.
Fourth, to limit Pacifica to radio programming goes against the
grain of the Court's opinion; indecent programming portrayed visu-
ally is likely to have a stronger impact than the same material broad-
cast over the radio. Therefore, not only do cable television viewers
warrant the same protection from offensive programming as radio
listeners, but the pervasiveness argument justifying a content ban on
indecent material is heightened when applied to cable.
B. Applications of the Argument for Permitting Regulation
In sum, proponents of this viewpoint can argue forcefully that
Pacifica's intrusiveness theory, which justifies regulation of radio
broadcasting to protect unconsenting adults and untutored children
from offensive material, logically extends to regulation of indecency
on cable television. If correct, however, such an argument proves only
that the Carlin monologue (and offensive language indistinguishably
indecent in context) could be banned from cable. The question re-
mains what are the limits of unconventional or offensive program-
ming that may be proscribed.
One approach to this question would be to analyze a series of actual
or hypothetical cable programs. Pacifica's repeated insistence that
indecency must be judged in context plausibly might be thought to
make futile any more general analysis. Yet any program-by-program
approach would ultimately degenerate into a string of tedious trivial-
ity. More importantly, if resolution of a series of cases yielded no
coherent standard for differentiating programs that are constitution-
ally protected from those legally proscribable, Pacifica justifiably
could be discarded as an unprincipled doctrine that permits capricious
results and, therefore, is an indefensible exercise of judicial power. 122
Accordingly, to determine whether Pacifica, in addition to autho-
rizing regulation of cable programs containing utterances of "obnox-
ious, gutter language" describing private "bodily functions" repeated
solely for their "shock value,"' 123 also permits censorship of more
widely defined categories of indecent programs, the better approach is
to analyze generalized standards. Two specific, generalized standards
are readily available and feature prominently in present legislative
debates. One is embodied in Morality in Media's model indecency
statute.'2 4 The other is represented by the Utah statute declared un-
122. Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 & n.3 (1973) (summary reversals of
convictions for dissemination of protected material after Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767 (1967), places court in position of subjectively judging material without
definitive standards).
123. 438 U.S. at 746 n.23 (quoting Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975)).
124. See supra note 19.
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constitutional in Wilkinson. ,25 The arguments for the validity of these
statutes are set out, in turn, below.
The Morality in Media statute is easier to defend. The statute's
definition of indecent material is well within the bounds of the Paci-
fica definition of indecency, that is, "nonconformance with accepted
standards of morality." 126 The Morality in Media statute defines inde-
cent material as that which is "[patently offensive] under contempo-
rary community standards for cable television." 127
Appeal to the prurient interest, an element of the obscene, is not
essential to determining whether particular programming is indecent.
Pacifica's extension of the bounds of permissible regulation beyond
Miller was no accident. Rejecting Pacifica's argument that nonob-
scene material is protected under the first amendment, the Court
stated that "Pacifica's position would . . . deprive the Commission of
any power to regulate erotic telecasts unless they were obscene under
Miller v. California. . . . Anything that could be sold at a newsstand
for private examination could be publicly displayed on television." 2 8
Further, quoting the FCC, the Court stated:
[W]hile a nudist magazine may be within the protection of the
First Amendment ... the televising of nudes might well raise a
serious question .... Similarly, regardless of whether the "4-let-
ter words" and sexual description, set forth in "[Liady Chatterly's
Lover," (when considered in the context of the whole book) make
the book obscene for mailability purposes, the utterance of such
words or the depiction of such sexual activity on radio or TV would
raise ... public interest and [statutory] questions.' 29
The definition of indecency set forth in Pacifica encompasses pat-
ently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities,
in addition to nonobscene "erotic" or sexually provocative broadcast-
ing. That the cable programs may have serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical or scientific value is not relevant for the same reason it was not
relevant in Pacifica. The objection is not to the idea but to its manner
of expression. The Pacifica Court concluded that regulating indecent
broadcasting will primarily affect the form, and not the content, of
communication, since "[t]here are few, if any, thoughts that cannot
be expressed by the use of less offensive language."1 30
125. See supra notes 5, 7.
126. 438 U.S. at 740 (footnote omitted).
127. See supra note 19.
128. 438 U.S. at 744 n.19 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 741 n.16 (quoting En bane Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303,
2307 (1960)).
130. 438 U.S. at 743 n.18.
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For these reasons, it may be argued, Morality in Media's definition
of indecency appears to fall squarely within the permissible bounds
delineated by Pacifica, notwithstanding the apparently contrary indi-
cations of Miller, Cohen and Erznoznik. Two categories of the defini-
tion (representation or verbal descriptions of a human sexual or excre-
tory organ or function, and sexual acts) are expressly subject to
regulation by the terms of Pacifica.'31 The other two categories (nu-
dity and masturbation) may certainly be proscribed by analogy. The
statute, however, does not cover all such depictions or verbal descrip-
tions. Rather, the "context" phrase in the statute permits regulation of
only those materials patently offensive by contemporary community
standards, incorporating important limiting standards adopted in
Miller.132 Therefore, the statute allows the social value of the material
as a whole to be considered, that is, the "context" in which the
material at issue is printed, in determining whether it is indecent.
Thus, for example, nudity represented by an infant, a documentary
on tribal cultures or medical treatments probably would not be pro-
scribed under the statute.
The Utah indecency statute proscribes specific categories of com-
munication relating to nudity and sexual activity.1 33 Lacking the Mo-
rality in Media "context" phrase, the statute prohibits certain types of
communication without regard to the work as a whole or even
whether the material presented is grossly or patently offensive. Never-
theless, the statute is a good deal more explicit than the federal
provision utilized in Pacifica, which merely proscribed "indecent or
profane language."'' 34 Because the Pacifica majority concluded that
indecent programming may constitutionally encompass broadcasts
"not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality,"'' 35 it
can be argued that Utah's failure to judge the context in which an
offensive depiction takes place is irrelevant. If the FCC may deter-
mine what is indecent by such standards, surely the Utah legislature
may determine specifically what portrayals of sex acts and sexual
organs are offensive to its citizens. Although the statute would pro-
scribe cable programs depicting a nude baby or nonobscene erotic
views of a woman's breasts, 36 "[a] requirement that indecent [de-
131. See id. at 743.
132. The statute imposes a community, not a national standard, to be measured
by the territorial area covered by the franchise. Therefore, where morality standards
differ from community to community, that which is determined to be patently
offensive may also differ.
133. See supra notes 5, 7.
134. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
135. See 438 U.S. at 740 n.14 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictio-
nary (1966)).
136. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1227(2) (Supp. 1981); see also Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975).
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scriptions or depictions] be avoided will have its primary effect on the
form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are
few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less
offensive language." 137
Thus, proponents of regulation may argue that a fair reading of
Pacifica would permit a simple, straightforward prohibition of inde-
cent material on cable television. Although the Court specifically
decided only whether Carlin's monologue was indecent, and therefore
regulable, its definition of indecency may be applied to analogous
communications.
C. The Case Against Permitting Regulation:
Reading Pacifica in Context
The preceding description of the case for allowing prohibitions on
indecent cable programs demonstrates that at least three different
possibilities must be considered. First, could the identical material at
issue in Pacifica, the Carlin monologue, be prohibited on cable? If so,
may government more generally ban, as would Morality in Media,
nonobscene depictions of human sexual or excretory organs, nudity,
and sexual acts that nevertheless are "patently offensive" under "con-
temporary community standards for cable television?" Finally, may
an even wider censorship be permissible, such as the Utah statute
banning nudity on the grounds that it is "indecent," regardless of its
pruriency, offensiveness or redeeming social value?
Each of these questions must be answered in the negative, notwith-
standing the apparent force of the arguments offered by proponents of
such censorship. The key flaw in all those arguments is that they
consider Pacifica in isolation, rather than placing the opinion in the
niche it truly, and deservedly, occupies: a limited exception, for an
extreme, virtually non-replicable case, to the general rule established
by the Miller-Cohen-Erznoznik trilogy. The misreading of Pacifica is,
unfortunately, facilitated by some of the extraordinarily loose and
broad dicta expressed in the Court's opinion which can easily con-
found the uncritical or untutored reader. Carefully read, and consid-
ered against the backdrop of precedent, Pacifica truly is what Justice
Stevens (the author of Pacifica) inartfully, but explicitly, said it was: a
case about seven dirty words on radio and no more.138
The Court's invitation to read its holding narrowly must be taken
seriously. For if Pacifica lays down a general rule concerning "intru-
137. 438 U.S. at 743 n.18.
138. See id. at 750. Professor Tribe noted that "Pacifica should be confined to its
facts, and eventually discarded as a 'derelict in the stream of the law."' L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 67-68 (Supp. 1979) (quoting North Dakota State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973)).
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sive media" that applies to cable, that rule equally affects all manner
of communication that may enter the home when unsupervised chil-
dren are present, including newspapers, magazines, books and rec-
ords. 139 And if Pacifica establishes a general power to censor speech
that is "indecent," "patently offensive" or "not conforming to gener-
ally accepted standards of morality," the decision does more than
overrule Miller, Cohen and Erznoznik; it obliterates a virtually unin-
terrupted line of cases, all to the effect that the form of speech does not
determine its legality, 140 and returns to the discredited 141 two-tier first
amendment theory. 142
That Pacifica is, indeed, a narrow opinion emerges if the rationale
employed by the Court is examined more closely in light of these
concerns. The Court's opinion is, in fact, narrowly confined to cases
concerning both the precise language conveyed and the particular
medium of communication employed in that case. Pacifica is about
dirty words on radio.
1. Dirty Words...
That Pacifica is a "dirty words" case, not a statement about "inde-
cent," "offensive" or "erotic" language, is expressed in the text of the
opinion itself. Although the content of Carlin's monologue was admit-
tedly considered nonobscene, the language of the opinion closely re-
sembles that justifying obscenity regulation. Justice Stevens stated that
"[Carlin's monologue] offend[s] for the same reasons that obscenity
offends." 143 Further, he quoted the Commission in a footnote: "Ob-
noxious, gutter language describing these matters has the effect of
debasing and brutalizing human beings by reducing them to their
139. Pacifica, however, expressly held that the decision did not extend to tapes
and records. 438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
140. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949).
141. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 3, at 1178-90.
142. This theory had its origin in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942). Chaplinsky established four categories of speech-the obscene, the profane,
the libelous and the "fighting word"-each of which was placed outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment. Id. at 571-72. Thus, the content of speech that fell
within one of these categories could be regulated regardless of its effect; all other
speech would be accorded first amendment protection unless it presented a clear and
present danger of harm. This two-tier analysis has been virtually discarded by the
Supreme Court. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 3, at 1181-83.
Professor Tribe observed that Justice Stevens, in writing the majority opinion in
Pacifica, sought "to resurrect a new two-level theory of First Amendment rights
based on [dictum in Chaplinsky]." L. Tribe, supra note 138, at 65 n.48. Professor
Tribe criticized this attempt, and noted that the majority of the Court has since
expressly disclaimed this aspect of Justice Stevens' decision. Id.
143. 438 U.S. at 746.
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mere bodily functions."1 44 To this Justice Stevens added that our
society traditionally limits "public exposure or discussion" of privately
performed bodily functions.145
Moreover, to read Pacifica as sanctioning regulation of any poten-
tially offensive or indecent language is at odds with Cohen and
Erznoznik. Cohen's jacket was emblazoned with the ultimate in inde-
cent language, "Fuck," yet the Court held that Cohen's expression was
protected under the first amendment. Therefore, unless Pacifica is
construed to overrule Cohen, which it clearly did not, the mere
utterance of an indecent word is not subject to regulation. Further,
Erznoznik is not intelligible if Pacifica is not simply a dirty words
case. For nudity can be equally "offensive" as dirty words, but Miller
did not permit government to equate offensive nudity with obscenity.
Thus, although purportedly addressing the issue of indecency,
Pacifica actually concerns a narrow aspect of obscenity inadvertently
overlooked by the Court in Miller. 146 Words that graphically convey
sexual ideas are not for that reason alone obscene and unprotected,
but may be subject to proscription when repeatedly uttered solely for
their shock value. Although Carlin's monologue clearly did not appeal
to the prurient interest, it may fall under the latter two Miller tests for
regulable speech. That is, the material may be considered to describe
sexual conduct and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner
and taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific qualities.
That is not to say, however, that Miller's "appeal to the prurient
interest" test is to be cast aside, but rather that the Miller Court
intended to include in the category of unprotected speech certain
graphic depictions or descriptions of sexual activities or body organs
which, although not appealing to the prurient interest in sex, are
sufficiently offensive by contemporary community standards to war-
rant inclusion in the obscenity category. This is why Justice Stevens
pointedly asserted that Carlin's "words offend for the same reasons
that obscenity offends." 147 Indeed, the Court in Miller overtly recog-
nized a similar point. As an example of regulable obscenity, the Court
included patently offensive representations or descriptions of excretory
functions. 48 Although such material usually would not appeal to the
prurient interest, it is regulable obscenity under Miller as long as the
latter two tests are met. Therefore, Pacifica did not radically depart
from Miller in holding that repeated utterances of patently offensive
144. Id. at 746 n.23.
145. Id.
146. See Pacifica Found. v. F.C.C., 556 F.2d 9, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leven-
thai, J., dissenting), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
147. 438 U.S. at 746.
148. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
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words relating to excretory and sexual organs and activities, purely for
their shock value, may be regulated. That, in addition to regulable
obscenity as defined in Miller, is all that may constitutionally be
proscribed. Put another way, had Cohen's jacket or Erznoznik's
screen contained all "seven dirty words" and nothing else, Pacifica
teaches that each would have presented a different case.
2.... on radio
Even as reconstituted, however, Cohen's and Erznoznik's cases
would not have been easy victories for their prosecutors because
Pacifica is also limited by the nature of the medium involved. Indeed,
the Court specifically invited such a limiting construction, emphasiz-
ing that "differences between radio, television, and perhaps closed-
circuit transmissions, may also be relevant."'' 49 Thus, by its terms,
Pacifica does not extend to content regulation on cable television. To
the extent, however, that Pacifica may be read to permit the regula-
tion of less-than-obscene material on "uniquely pervasive" and
"uniquely accessible" media, those phrases, however accurately they
describe radio, cannot sensibly encompass cable programming.150 The
cable medium differs extensively from radio, and therefore should be
governed by the standards for permissible content regulation set forth
in Miller. One need not share the views of a Court, composed entirely
of men born during the era of the crystal set, that unsuspecting adults
cannot protect themselves from unexpected, offensive radio program-
ming in their homes or that radio broadcasting is uniquely accessible
to children to understand that these men believe radio is unique and to
realize that cable shares none of radio's assertedly unique attributes.
a. Pervasiveness
By its nature, it is highly unlikely that cable programming would be
an unwelcome, pervasive intruder in the home. In almost all cases,
cable television is a subscription service. An individual desiring to
bring cable programming into his home must arrange for it with a
cable operator, pay an initial installation fee, and then pay a monthly
fee. Thus, cable programming is voluntarily admitted into the home,
and that choice is reaffirmed regularly by the payment of monthly
fees. To end any "intrusion," the individual need simply cancel his
subscription to the cable service. Because a conscious and continuing
149. 438 U.S. at 750.
150. Even on radio broadcasts, Pacifica does not authorize the proscription of all
potentially offensive communication. The Court suggested that its decision might
have been different had the content been such that it would not command the
attention of children or if the broadcast had been aired during the late evening hours
when fewer children would be in the audience. See id. at 750 n.28.
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choice to purchase the programming is required to receive cable tele-
vision, it is inconceivable that the system could be viewed as an
unwelcome intruder without similarly classifying home-delivered
newspapers and magazines or subscription services for books or rec-
ords. Surely, all these media cannot simultaneously be "uniquely
pervasive."
Further, the success of any cable system depends upon convincing
the public to purchase the service, as well as avoiding expensive
disconnections. It is therefore in the programmer's best business inter-
est to make the viewing public aware of what is being shown. Misin-
formed viewers could potentially be dissatisfied viewers who would
discontinue their service. This economic incentive on the part of the
cable operator to keep the viewing public fully informed increases the
probability that cable programming would not be an unwelcome
intruder.
In addition to receiving information concerning the types of pro-
gramming the system offers before purchase, after purchasing the
system the viewer typically receives detailed program guides relating
to the specific material that will be shown over the monthly period.
For example, HBO's guide describes the program offered, and for
feature films, lists the ratings assigned by the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America. 151 The guide gives further details on the programs,
such as whether they contain "violence," "nudity," "profanity,"
"adult humor," "adult situations," or "strong sexual content," to assist
the viewer in deciding whether to watch the program and in monitor-
ing his children's viewing.
Moreover, many systems divide their programming into "pay tiers,"
with separate charges for each tier. For example, "Super TV,- a
Washington, D.C. area station, offers both a regular service and a
"Night Life" service that shows late night films for "adult" audi-
ences. 15 2 Although Super TV shows no "X-" rated movies, those shown
in its "Night Life" package may be characterized as "hard-R." "Night
Life" is an optional, extra service, for which the viewer pays an
additional fee.
For all these reasons, the right of those who voluntarily admit cable
programming into their homes to be shielded from offensive speech is
surely no greater, and is probably less compelling, than the right of
those people confronted with Cohen's jacket in a Los Angeles County
courtroom or unsuspecting passersby in Erznoznik. The same duty to
151. See, e.g., HBO Guide (Apr. 1982).
152. See Super TV Program Guide (Mar. 1982). The station is not a cable system,
but a broadcast station that transmits a scrambled signal and leases decoders for a
fee. For the reasons stated in the text, these stations also fall outside the media
reached by Pacifica.
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avert one's eyes or turn off the program applies. The obligation to do
so is stronger in the case of a cable subscriber who receives the
material by choice.
b. Accessibility
Pacifica's second basis for justifying content regulation of indecent
radio broadcasts is that radio is uniquely accessible to young children,
in whose interest the state has wide latitude to censor speech. No such
argument could plausibly be advanced in the cable context.
First, parents are entirely free to choose whether to subscribe to
cable television. When both parents and child desire that the minor
have access to communication, the state has no particularly compel-
ling claim to authority to displace those choices. 53 Pacifica simply
concludes that receipt of some media requires no more affirmative act
than the purchase of a receiver and that, under modern conditions,
the "choice" whether to have a radio in the home is scarcely a realistic
option.
Moreover, the program guides issued by the cable operator inform
parents well in advance of the types of programming that will be
shown. 54 Parents who wish to prevent their children from viewing, or
be with them during the program, are enabled to do so. In addition,
lock boxes and parental keys are widely available as a means of
excluding children. These involve either a lock placed on the channel,
or a scrambled signal that may be unscrambled by either a key or a
code entered into the system. 55 These protections provide additional
means for parents effectively to monitor their children's viewing.
As the foregoing indicates, an asserted desire to protect children is
not a valid justification for regulating indecency on cable program-
ming. To hold Pacifica applicable to cable on that basis would permit
similar regulation of magazines and newspapers as well; cable is no
more uniquely accessible to children than these forms of speech. All
must be affirmatively opened or turned on. If anything, cable affords
a greater opportunity to monitor, ahead of time, what will be seen.
And lock boxes provide as much protection for children as placing
indecent reading material in a locked drawer.
c. Physical and Economic Characteristics
As observed earlier, 56 the traditional rationale for content regula-
tion of radio, that such rules are permissible ancillary effects of the
153. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 3, at 1241-59.
154. See supra text accompanying note 151.
155. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 3, at 1275-76.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
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need to supervise the allocation by government of a scarce resource,
did not and could not justify the result in Pacifica. Nevertheless, the
preceding analysis reveals that a key to understanding Pacifica's intru-
sion rationale is the fact that radio broadcasts are simply transmitted
into the open air. In this respect, cable television is more akin to the
printed media than the "broadcast" media; indeed, the only notable
characteristic cable shares with television is the television screen. For
these purposes, cable television is essentially an electronic newspa-
per. 1 57 Unconstrained by spectrum scarcity, the number of channels
available to a cable system is virtually unlimited, and the number of
cable systems that can be built in a neighborhood, like the number of
newspapers or books that can be delivered there, is limited only by the
laws of economics and not those of physics.
Thus, cable regulation geared to the "public interest" by promoting
or avoiding programs that appeal to the mass populace is unnecessary.
A content ban would prevent the wide dissemination of diverse view-
points and obstruct the flow of ideas, a result contrary to the first
amendment. Content regulation of programs some might find offen-
sive impermissibly encroaches upon the constitutionally protected in-
terests of those who wish to communicate, and those who wish to
receive, such material.
D. Application of a More Prudent Reading of Pacifica
Thus, because neither the traditional scarcity rationale, nor the
new intrusiveness rationale, applies to regulation of cable program-
ming, content regulation of cable should be governed by the Miller
guidelines. If material shown on cable is obscene under the Miller
tests, it is unprotected speech under the first amendment. If, however,
the material shown is not obscene, it is outside the scope of permissible
regulation.
In light of the previous discussion, the Utah statute' 58 struck down
in Wilkinson' 59 is patently unconstitutional. That statute proscribes
clearly protected communication, such as the mere description or
depiction of nude or partially denuded figures, without regard to the
work as a whole, prurient appeal or patent offensiveness. Many films
afforded first amendment protection when shown in theatres include
depictions or descriptions of "illicit sex or sexual immorality," yet such
movies are not considered "obscene," and therefore are not regulable
under Miller. Pacifica did not extend Miller to encompass blanket
157. See Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: The FCC, The First
Amendment and The Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 133 (1976).
158. See supra notes 5, 7.
159. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
1983]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
proscriptions such as those in the Utah statute. Rather, Pacifica repre-
sents a narrow exception to the general Miller tests. Because the Utah
statute fails to employ the Miller safeguards, it is unconstitutional.
Morality in Media's model indecency statute 6 0 is unconstitutional
to the extent that it proscribes less than obscene material. Facially, the
statute appears to come close to the Miller suggestions of permissible
regulation. 6 1 The statute, however, lacks the Miller three-part test.
"Patent offensiveness" is but one element of Miller's three-part test. It
is not enough for material merely to be patently offensive to relinquish
its first amendment protection-it must be obscene. And to be ob-
scene, the material, taken as a whole, must appeal to the prurient
interest and lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Because the Morality in Media statute does not employ these safe-
guards, it is unconstitutional under Miller.
For example, a single scene of "patently offensive" nudity or a
sexual innuendo in a film shown on cable could make its presentation
a violation under the statute. Yet these same movies are afforded first
amendment protection when shown in a theatre because they are not
obscene under the Miller test. One cannot plausibly argue that such
scenes represent an inadvertent gap in Miller's definition of obscenity.
The portrayal of sexual conduct was precisely what Miller was all
about. Cable television operators and subscribers are entitled to
no less first amendment protection than moviegoers, and nothing in
Pacifica fairly points to a contrary conclusion. Indecent material,
which does not rise to the level of obscenity, may not constitutionally
be proscribed on cable television.
The regulation of Carlin's monologue, or similar offensive speech,
on cable presents a more difficult issue, for it squarely raises the
question whether the obscenity-gap-filling rationale of Pacifica162 is
limited to "uniquely pervasive" and "uniquely accessible" media.6 3
Pacifica clearly extended Miller to encompass an additional category
of regulable speech-repeated utterances over the radio of patently
offensive "dirty words" purely for their shock value. The Pacifica
exception, however, should be confined to "unique media." Indeed,
the Pacifica majority apparently recognized this point when it con-
cluded that the Carlin monologue was constitutionally protected if
delivered via the medium of records. 6 4
By any conceivable test of "uniqueness" that does not disregard
Miller, Cohen and Erznoznik, cable television must be a "non-
160. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 143-48.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 149-57.
164. See 438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
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unique" (like records) rather than a "unique" (like radio) medium.
Like a record, a cable subscription is voluntarily and knowingly pur-
chased, easily discarded and easily shielded from children. To be sure,
cable, like radio, is received on a broadcast receiver in the home. But
this similarity is irrelevant to the first amendment values that led the
Court to announce the "unique media" standard in Pacifica. Were the
Court to conclude otherwise, truly impossible distinctions would be
necessary. Imagine a court, having held the Carlin monologue pro-
tected on records, but unprotected on radio and cable, confronted
with a videodisc of the same program.
This definition of "unique" not only accounts for the Pacifica result,
but also renders the decision capable of logical explication. Thus,
content regulation on cable should be governed by the Miller rule,
rather than the Pacifica exception, and Carlin's monologue should be
constitutionally protected if communicated as cable programming.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis indicates, Pacifica inartfully clouded the
boundaries of permissible regulation of cable television programming.
Assuredly, many of the above-stated reasons for invalidating statutes
banning indecency on cable could conceivably be applied to radio as
well. Further, the breadth and looseness of the Court's dicta confess-
edly make one pause before concluding that the Court believed it
confronted only an isolated, overlooked instance of obscenity. Yet
reflection suggests that only the very limited reading of Pacifica es-
poused in this Article makes any sense, unless we are to assume that,
to be blunt, the majority lied about what it meant in Pacifica.
Miller, Cohen, and Erznoznik were reaffirmed in Pacifica. This
must be taken to signify that the latter opinion means only what it
plainly says: The first amendment does not protect the indiscriminate
distribution via open airwaves of exceedingly vulgar language uttered
only for its shock value. A principled (in the sense of logical and
objectively applicable) rationale explains why that exception can co-
exist with dominant first amendment jurisprudence, even though the
rationale may not satisfactorily justify the exception in terms of endur-
ing first amendment values.165 Justice Stevens virtually begs the reader
to supply a rationale that will confine Pacifica to its facts. Having
accepted that invitation, one can only assume the rationale will be
accepted in return.
Consider the alternative. The danger of extending Pacifica to cable
is self-evident. Such an extension would not only open the door to
limit what is increasingly becoming an important additional means of
disseminating diverse ideas and information, but also would threaten
165. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 3, at 1280-84.
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to destroy the first amendment rights of individuals to say, see and
hear what they choose. As the Court has aptly stated elsewhere,
"[w]hatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of
ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally prem-
ise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts." 166 The state simply may not constitutionally regulate offen-
sive material merely to protect its citizens' moral sensibilities, cer-
tainly not when the acquisition of that material requires an affirma-
tive, informed choice by an adult.
Furthermore, to suggest, as would the broader reading of Pacifica,
that the content of expression often can be divorced from its form is
fallacious. As Justice Harlan stated in Cohen, "[the form of expres-
sion] serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas
capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inex-
pressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force."16 7 A simple illustration is pro-
vided by the once controversial line in "Gone With the Wind," in
which Rhett Butler tells Scarlett O'Hara, "Frankly, my dear, I don't
give a damn!" Any change in the form of that line would alter its
expressive content.
Cable programming potentially is available to everyone. It is also,
and equally, avoidable by anyone. These conditions are sufficient
protection for potentially offensive speech. Adults should not be re-
duced to seeing what is fit for children, 168 nor should either group be
subjected to viewing only that which is "palatable to the most squea-
mish among us.' 1 69 These principles are deeply imbedded in our
jurisprudence. More than loose, over-written dicta in a single opinion
will be required to dislodge them.
166. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (states may not proscribe
possession inside the home of obscene material).
167. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
168. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
169. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
